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Abstract. This paper will examine how legal considerations arising from the 
aggregation of data impact upon technical access control mechanisms. Research 
findings are based on a multi-disciplinary investigation of security issues 
regarding the aggregation of data in a governmental federated database system. 
The researchers conclude that the development of a federated architecture must 
consider technical security concerns within the context of legal risk 
management issues. As such, a holistic approach to the investigation of 
information security is required that incorporates the disciplines of information 
technology and law. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper, we outline key issues regarding the development of a governmental 
federated database system to aggregate geo-spatial data. Specifically, we focus on 
how legal risk management concepts, such as, liability and compliance, impact upon 
technical architectures. The paper will then proceed to outline how particular legal 
issues, such as, information management concerns and public record keeping 
requirements can shape the form and location of access control measures.  
This paper aims to contribute to the development of federated database systems in 
government by highlighting the interdependent relationship that the disciplines of law 
and information technology have on each other, which can affect overall architectural 
design and subsequent implementation of security measures. It is likely that federated 
database systems, to aggregate data of all kinds, will become a common feature of e-
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government data sharing projects given the traditional “silo” based information 
structures of government departments. As such, it is important to identify all potential 
constraints to development and include technical, legal and other concerns that may 
inhibit the successful implementation of federated database projects. Whilst the paper 
is focused on research conducted within Queensland Government, many of the 
concepts outlined have potential application in other jurisdictions because the issues 
raised are not unique to the Australian situation. The issues highlighted in the paper 
are equally applicable to governments throughout the world, especially those that are 
aiming to establish federated database systems to aggregate data. The paper provides 
an indication of how fundamental legal concepts can shape security designs and 
future research will make further contributions to the literature by examining some 
key e-government issues, such as, multi-disciplinary research models, information 
sharing and implementation strategies. 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline the background to the 
project including the purpose of the research and the methodology adopted. Section 3 
details the proposed technical architecture. Section 4 provides a high level 
examination of legal concepts that are relevant to the technical architecture and the 
aggregation of data. Section 5 outlines key information security issues, with particular 
focus on access control measures and describes how legal considerations impact upon 
the design and implementation of security measures. Finally, Section 6 concludes the 
paper and briefly details future work. 
2. Background 
Governments throughout the world have been collecting geo-spatial information for a 
number of years. Despite this, it is not until relatively recently that governments have 
started to realize new applications for geo-spatial data held under their custodianship. 
This is primarily due to technological developments that have made the aggregation 
of data more feasible and more readily realizable. In particular, it is now widely 
recognized that benefits can be gained from the aggregation of geo-spatial data which 
provides new insight for policy making and opens up new commercial opportunities 
by bringing together different data sets and overlaying data into a single geo-spatial 
representation [14].  
Problems can arise in the aggregation of geo-spatial data in government federated 
database systems because existing data has traditionally been collected and held 
within separate agency “data silos” [15]. Thus far, geo-spatial data has generally been 
collected for the individual purposes of different agencies rather than for the benefit 
of government as a whole. As such, individual agency data collection has been 
conducted independent of other government agencies. Concerns are further 
compounded because it is common for each individual data silo to have different data 
life-cycles and to be subject to different information management and security 
frameworks. The development of a government federated database system for the 
aggregation of geo-spatial data therefore has technical issues enmeshed with legal and 
risk management concerns involving information management [16]. 
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In this context, [Organisation1] [9] is a major Queensland Government initiative to 
provide a central Internet portal for the dissemination of geo-spatial information held 
by different Queensland Government agencies. A federated database system is being 
developed to establish interoperability of different agency information systems and to 
enhance geo-spatial data sharing across Queensland Government. Essentially, 
[Organisation1] will lead to the development of a whole of government publication 
strategy for geo-spatial data [10].  
Researchers from the [Institution] have embarked on a three year research project 
with [Organisation1] funded by the [Organisation2] [6] and the [Organisation3] [19]. 
The aim of the project is to develop a unified security and legal framework for 
[Organisation1]. The framework will incorporate multiple agency geo-spatial datasets 
even though each dataset will have their own individual security and information 
architecture.  
We adopt a multidisciplinary methodological approach to security that 
encompasses technical analysis with legal and risk management issues. A 
comprehensive technical analysis involves consideration of possible security 
architectures for access control. Legal research entails an investigation of different 
areas of law that could impact upon the consideration of those security architectures, 
such as, information management concerns, public recordkeeping requirements and 
liability issues.  
During the first phase of the project, each disciplinary group undertook reviews of 
the extant literature to obtain an understanding of key issues. Qualitative semi-
structured interviews were conducted with key Queensland Government personnel to 
gain knowledge about the current technical/legal/risk environment at an agency level 
to further research input into the design of the federated technical architecture for the 
aggregation of data. 
3. Technical Architecture  
Figure 1 details the proposed technical architecture for the [Organisation1] federated 
database system. The architecture is composed of three tiers: 
 
− The Agency Tier:  At the lower level, the Agency Tier consists of the different 
government agencies that provide geo-spatial data to be aggregated. The agencies 
hold the data within their own information systems and have custodial 
responsibilities over the stored data. The data is transferred from the agencies to be 
aggregated in the next level of the architecture;  
 
− The Aggregation Tier: At the mid-section, the actual aggregation of agency data 
takes place. It is likely that the tier will consist of a geo-data processing server that 
aggregates the data and a web server that publishes the aggregated output to the 
User Tier. Effectively, the Aggregation Tier mediates between user requests for 
data and agency responses. User requests are decomposed and data requests passed 
on to the appropriate agencies. Individual agency responses are aggregated and 
served back to users; and 
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− The User Tier: The highest tier represents the users of the system. The project has 
been structured into different phases that gradually expand the user network from 
internal agencies to include other government agencies and eventually to the 
public. Users will be allowed to make requests, typically through a web browser, 
and view aggregated outputs. 
 
The arrows represent the flow of data and communications between all three 
layers. In practice, request communications flow down through the architecture whilst 
data is pushed up to satisfy requests.  
 
Fig. 1. Technical Architecture 
 
 
4. Legal Concepts Arising from the Aggregation of Data 
Two legal concepts are prevalent to the development of the technical architecture and 
the subsequent aggregation of data – future liabilities arising from the publication of 
erroneous information and compliance with existing relevant legislation and 
standards. Both of these concepts are relevant because the ultimate output for the 
aggregated data will be the public.  
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Traditionally, data access within government has been restricted to users within an 
agency, but with an integrated system, the pool of potential data users is widened 
substantially. It is clearly understood within government, that one agency can not sue 
another agency if the integrity of information is not maintained. If information 
published by one agency is published to another agency and the second agency acts 
upon or relies upon the information published by the first agency, the second agency 
cannot bring proceedings against the first agency. This changes when government 
publishes information to third parties outside of government and to the public because 
liabilities can flow from reliance upon inaccurate information. In turn, this can impact 
upon the location and the design of information security measures used to secure the 
technical architecture.  
The publication of incorrect data gives rise to liability issues under contract law 
(i.e. misleading or deceptive behavior), tort law (i.e. negligence or negligent 
misstatement) or from a specific statutory provision that places certain obligations on 
the accuracy or correctness of data and how that data should be used [2]. Liability 
issues are further complicated in federated database systems used to aggregate data 
because different datasets and different map layers may have varying degrees of 
accuracy [11]. Given the federated nature of aggregated data distribution, it can be 
problematic to establish which particular piece of data is responsible for an error, and 
in turn, which organization is responsible for supplying the inaccurate data. From a 
government organizational and legal risk management perspective, the issue at the 
heart of liability is therefore who is legally accountable for providing the erroneous 
data [1]. This is an important point. In theory, a legal action will be brought against 
government as a whole, but in practice, funds to cover the legal action will have to be 
found from existing agency budgets. It is likely that the agency that provided the 
incorrect data will ultimately bear the burden of paying legal fees for a subsequent 
action. 
Although there has not been an Australian case regarding liability from the 
aggregation of geo-spatial data, it is likely that a future legal action would refer to US 
case law regarding the accuracy of maps given the analogous nature of common law 
analysis [3]. Under US law, it is possible that liability for inaccurate information can 
arise from inaccurate maps where (a) a map is based on erroneous data and (b) where 
a map is based on accurate data but the representation of that data is inaccurate [7]. 
This is a distinction between issues of data content and issues of data context [1]. 
Issues of data content refer to the accuracy of data itself. Issues of data context refer 
to the notion that the aggregated representation properly represents the data upon 
which it is based, i.e. the map, or in this case, the aggregated spatial output is an 
accurate representation of the agency data provided. This point is critical because 
potential liabilities may arise in both the data held by agencies at the Agency Tier and 
by the subsequent aggregation of that data in the Aggregation Tier.  
Information management structures are therefore a key concern in the legal 
analysis of the technical architecture and the aggregation of data. It is important that 
these structures are compliant with existing information management standards 
because this can be a method of mitigating potential liabilities [18]. An organization 
that has complied with recognized standards will have a stronger argument in any 
future legal action because it can claim that it took all possible actions to avoid a risk 
of harm from arising [4]. This is particularly relevant in Queensland because Section 
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35 of the Civil Liability Act 2003 (QLD) [5] acknowledges the financial constraints 
that public authorities face and recognizes that an agency can only provide a level of 
service that it is funded to provide. If an agency can show that it has properly 
exercised its functions and it can demonstrate that it has complied with general 
procedures and applicable standards, then Section 35 could have the effect of 
mitigating liability because the subsequent harm was beyond the resources available 
to the agency. 
Compliance issues also arise in situations where government agencies are obliged 
by legislation or regulation to act in a specific way. For example, the public good 
emanating from accurate recordkeeping by governmental organizations is recognized 
by the statutory obligations placed on agencies to record, maintain and destroy 
records within certain guidelines. Queensland Government is no exception. The 
Public Records Act 2002 (QLD) [17] provides guidelines for agency recordkeeping 
which are supported by a range of information standards. Furthermore, the 
Queensland Financial Management Standard 1997 [8] engenders a governance 
framework that applies to all Queensland State Government agencies which requires 
that an agency develop a strategic and operational plan for each financial year. The 
Standard also requires agencies to implement key information security measures. 
Section 70 requires agencies to develop information systems to provide for certain 
fundamental elements such as access controls and audit trails. Section 71(1) requires 
that an agency must develop and implement internal controls to ensure the effective, 
efficient and economical management of the agency’s resources and to accomplish 
the agency’s strategic goals. With regards to security of information systems, Section 
71(2) requires agencies to provide for certain mandatory internal controls such as 
authorization and authentication mechanisms. 
An examination of these two underlying legal concepts reveals an understanding of 
how legal principles can impact upon the design of technical architectures for the 
aggregation of data. We will proceed now to show how legal issues – data 
custodianship, retaining public records and financial management – can affect the 
design of specific information security measures. 
5. Legal Issues That Shape Security Measures 
As highlighted above, the information management structure used within the 
technical architecture is a crucial concern both in terms of future liabilities and 
compliance with existing laws. In Australia, the custodianship model is becoming the 
prevailing information management system to co-ordinate and provide a control 
structure for the effective management of aggregated data [13] [12]. A data custodian 
can be defined as a public official who has physical and legal custody of data, and 
public records, and holds this information on behalf of a corporate entity or 
government agency [3]. Information management responsibilities are concentrated in 
data custodians and their role is essentially to be an information trustee that holds 
government data for the benefit of the public. Individual agencies retain custodianship 
over particular data sets but whole of government endeavors are made easier to realize 
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through the standardization of corporate-wide practices that reduce duplication of data 
and maximize value added product development [4].  
On a day-to-day management level, data custodians ultimately decide what data is 
collected, aggregated and released to the public. Data custodians are based at the 
Agency Tier and are responsible for data quality (including the integrity, security and 
confidentiality of data), availability of data and access to data. As such, they play a 
key role in the development of a security structure for a governmental federated 
database system used to aggregate data. In turn, the development of a federated 
aggregation system impacts on the data custodian model because custodians do not 
have total control over the uses of their data.  
The data custodianship concept remains unchanged if the agency has management 
control over the data retained in its possession. However, when the data leaves the 
agency, as it does in a federated database system, that management control passes 
from the agency because another organization now has the opportunity to modify, 
manipulate or delete their data. Furthermore, agency data custodians cannot be 
accountable for potential liability arising from data context, i.e. inaccurate spatial 
representations based on accurate data, because the aggregated data it is effectively 
outside the control of agencies. Therefore, it is unlikely or at least very difficult for 
the agency data custodian concept to apply to aggregated data outputs produced in the 
Aggregation Tier. 
Limited or no custodian responsibilities at the Aggregation Tier also has 
consequences for the design, location and use of security measures because data 
custodians have a responsibility to ensure appropriate security procedures for their 
data. In Queensland, as highlighted above, this is mandated by Section 71(2) of the 
Financial Management Standard. Data custodianship is therefore legally relevant to 
security issues regarding authorization policies.  
Authorization policies across different agencies may vary widely. Agencies are 
generally unaware of what other data will be used with their data to form an 
aggregated output. It is therefore difficult for an agency to devise authorization 
policies that predicate on aggregate data. As such, harmonizing established 
authorization rules at the Agency Tier for future adoption and use in the Aggregated 
Tier is a major challenge. 
It is also likely that there will be different data classification schemes used by 
individual agencies. Inconsistent data classification is a potential problem because 
different agencies can apply different classifications to the same data or can use the 
same classifications for different data. Even assuming that different agencies could 
develop a consistent data classification scheme, another concern arises with the 
aggregated information itself. The aggregation of data contained in separate data sets 
may indicate information which is not intended for disclosure. For example, 
combining electricity grid and water reticulation maps may reveal information that 
would normally be made secret for defense and security related reasons. 
Data custodianship concerns also impact on the positioning of access controls. As 
there are different government agencies, each with a significant number of data sets, it 
is important to consider where authorization and authentication should be performed: 
  
(a) At the Aggregation Tier; and/or 
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(b) At the Agency Tier, either at the agency’s perimeter (e.g. web services 
gateway) or at the point of access to the data (i.e. using built-in data base 
mechanisms). 
 
If authorization policies are produced at the Aggregation Tier only, this may not be 
consistent with agency data custodial responsibilities. Furthermore, it is far from clear 
who will be accountable for devising policies as existing management structures are 
based at the Agency Tier. If authorization policies are created at the Agency Tier 
only, this precludes the application of authorization being considered for aggregated 
data. It seems unlikely that individual agencies would be considered wholly 
responsible for access control over data which they only partially hold, so they would 
have a limited role in determining access control rules for aggregated data. This 
responsibility would be better suited to the Aggregation Tier. It can be concluded that 
effective authorization policies should incorporate both policies from individual 
agencies, for data directly under their control, as well as policies by a different 
organization at the Aggregation Tier for aggregated data. However, this is an area 
requiring further research form both a legal and an information security point of view. 
If authentication is performed at the Aggregation Tier, on behalf of the agencies, 
then the access control functions performed by agencies are critically dependent on 
the organization bearing management responsibility of the Aggregation Tier. Again, 
this may not be consistent with individual agency custodial responsibilities. 
Furthermore, the consequences of compromise of the authentication service are 
important. If the authentication service is compromised then this exposes the data of 
all of the agencies. If however authentication is performed at the Agency Tier, for 
aggregation requests which require data from multiple agencies, authentication is 
performed in each agency, reducing the efficiency of the request processing. 
It is also questionable whether the instigation of authentication mechanisms solely 
at the Agency Tier will fulfill the requirements of the Financial Management 
Standard. Under the Standard, an agency must develop a strategic plan for the use of 
ICT resources within a whole of government context. In particular, the plan must 
evaluate the agency’s requirements regarding existing and additional ICT resources 
and state how the agency will optimize the use of, and fund, existing and future ICT 
resources. It is not clear whether housing multiple authentication mechanisms at the 
Agency Tier, for each agency, would fulfill those financial management obligations 
that require a whole of government outlook.  
The practical legal effects of data custodianship also manifest in recordkeeping and 
the retention of public records concerns. The recordkeeping and retention of public 
records is legally necessary to provide historical records, for example, evidence in the 
case of disputes arising over data alleged to have been obtained. Moreover, the Public 
Records Act places wide-ranging obligations on agencies to keep records of their 
activities. Section 6 of the Act defines a public record in a broad manner to effectively 
cover any information generated or received by an authority within its normal duties. 
A public record can also include a copy of a public record. Section 7 of the Act 
mandates agencies to keep full and accurate records of its activities. Section 7 also 
indicates that public recordkeeping and archiving activities should be in compliance 
with relevant standards and guidelines. 
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The legal issue of recordkeeping and retention of public records is probably of a 
lesser concern at the Agency Tier because the individual agencies should already have 
recordkeeping and record retaining functions in place as part of their normal day-to-
day management activities. The supply of data from an agency to the Aggregation 
Tier could be classed as an activity of an individual agency. If that is the case, 
agencies may be required to keep full and accurate records of the data provided. 
Furthermore, given the potential liability issues arising from aggregated 
representations (i.e., data context accuracy), it would be legally advisable to keep 
records for every transaction between the Aggregation Tier and the User Tier, 
particularly involving members of the public, so it could be definitively proven which 
aggregated representation was provided to which user. This evidence would be crucial 
in any subsequent legal action.  
A method to trace aggregated data is therefore required to identify and to correct 
source data. In other words, a mechanism may be needed, when it is provided with a 
piece of aggregated data, it identifies the component parts and the corresponding 
agencies from which that data was obtained. Being able to trace component data to its 
custodian may be essential in resolving liability disputes and who funds legal actions.  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have outlined how fundamental legal concepts and interrelated 
legal issues can impact upon the design, the development and the location of security 
measures in a government federated database system for the aggregation of geo-
spatial data. Legal and technical issues are enmeshed together because the legal 
concepts of liability and compliance need to be factored into the design of technical 
architectures. As such, it would be beneficial if the technical architecture took into 
account the possibility of future liabilities arising from aggregated publication at the 
very onset. Whilst it is possible to mitigate liability from the publication of incorrect 
data though purely legal mechanisms, such as disclaimers, the very structure of the 
technical architecture can also assist by acknowledging the crucial importance that 
information management structures have on technical and legal issues. 
Specifically, this paper outlined how legal issues such as information management 
concerns, in the form of data custodianship, public recordkeeping requirements and 
financial management standards can impact on security mechanisms such as access 
controls, authorization policies and authentication mechanisms.  
This paper represents research findings from the first phase of a three year project. 
Future work will continue to focus on the issues raised in this article and will 
ultimately seek to develop a multi-disciplinary methodological model that 
incorporates the academic disciplines of law, risk and information technology to 
provide a method of analysis, and a paradigm for discourse that frames research 
questions, regarding the aggregation of data in governmental federated database 
systems. This methodological model will provide a truly holistic outlook that 
recognizes and incorporates the different disciplinary requirements involved in the 
future development of governmental federated database systems and the subsequent 
aggregation of geo-spatial data.  
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